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Abstract 
 
 
A vast literature agrees on the impact of market size, physical infrastructure, 
macroeconomic stability, human capital, and trade openness on FDI. Besides, 
another related and equally important determinant is good governance. It is known 
that good governance is a pre-requisite for attracting FDI and hence to economic 
growth. The mini-thesis employs a panel data of 36 countries from sub-Saharan 
Africa over the period 1996-2000 to examine the impact of governance on FDI 
flows. Within the governance variable there are six sub-indices which are the rule 
of law, political stability, control of corruption, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. The estimates show that 
political stability, regulatory quality and accountability have a positive impact on 
FDI while corruption, government ineffectiveness, and lack of rule of law do not 
affect FDI. The conclusion drawn from this research is that besides market size, 
trade openness, human capital, macroeconomic stability and physical 
infrastructure, governance plays a great role in attracting FDI into the sub- region. 
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
 
Foreign direct investment1 2(FDI) has become increasingly recognized in 
providing a package of external resources that can contribute to economic 
development. Thus, if well managed, it offers either a complementary or 
alternative channel through which host countries can stimulate and sustain their 
economic growth rates. Therefore it is instrumental to identify those factors that 
have the potential to either impede or induce FDI flows into host countries. 
Needless to say, it is essential to recognize that FDI offers a mixture of positive 
and negative effects. It is then the task of the host country to separate these effects 
and take measures that maximize the positives but minimize the negatives (Bende-
Nabende, 2002). 
 
There is a contradictory evidence in literature regarding the impact of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and FDI on both short run and long-term 
economic growth. While some studies, both empirical and theoretical, indicate 
that FDI may have a strong positive effect on growth rates in developing 
countries, and others suggest that these positive effects may not be unconditional 
and point to the lack of technological spillovers and the possibility of creating an 
enclave economy in a country. 
 
Another important issue related to FDI is the low level of domestic investment in 
the host countries. Both economic theory and empirical evidences suggest that 
FDI has a beneficial impact in developing host countries. The importance of FDI 
is becoming obvious to economic growth of developing nations because these 
nations are unable to achieve the needed growth with their domestic investment. It 
                                                 
1
 Note that private foreign investment takes place in three forms: official finance that includes 
capital from multinational agencies like the IMF and the World Bank; indirect investment that 
includes portfolio investments, bond finance and bank lending; and foreign direct investment. In 
this paper we are discussing FDI. 
2
 According to the IMF FDI is defined as “an incorporated or incorporated enterprise in which a 
direct investor, who is resident in another economy, owns 10% or more of the ordinary share of 
voting power or the equivalent.” 
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is well documented in the literature of FDI. Hence, it is obvious to policy makers 
in those countries that FDI really assists economic growth. This can be carried out 
through employment creation, technology transfers, promoting managerial skills, 
increasing local market, creating export capacity and corporate tax (Asiedu, 2003, 
2001; Loungani and Razan, 2001). Beyond facilitating growth, FDI has also other 
potentially desirable features that affect the quality of growth and assist with 
poverty reduction (Klein, Aaron and Hadjimichael, 2001; Jenkins and Thomas, 
2002). 
 
Another related and equally unfavorable vigor is the lack of good governance. 
Africa today is not only facing an economic crisis characterized by famine, 
malnutrition, soaring rates of unemployment, refugees, and severe poverty, but is 
also burdened by serious political problems, including one-person rule, violation 
of human rights, inter-ethnic and interregional conflict, lack of tolerance for 
minority groups, ineffective legal system that protect property and human rights, 
inefficient public institutions; lack of accountability and lack of democracy 
(Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Hamdok, 2001; Kaufmann, Kraay and Matruzzi, 
2003). All these problems have projected an image that Africa is a region riddled 
by crises and not conducive to investment. As a result of the above problems that 
engulfed Africa in the 1980s and the 1990s, many investors have developed a 
perception that investing in Africa is bound to oil and natural resources and this 
shows Africa is ‘‘different’’ even if there is some progress on governance 
(Asiedu, 2001: 108). 
 
Besides lack of good governance, the likelihood of expropriation contributes to 
the lack of investor confidence. Predictability of conditions and lack of 
arbitrariness may be the most important assurance that can be offered to investors, 
who seem to adapt to practically any conditions as long as the rules are clearly 
established in advance and followed subsequently. 
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1.2 Trends and Magnitude of FDI in Developing Countries 
 
FDI is becoming an increasingly important factor in the economic development of 
Africa and other developing countries. FDI, in the last two decades, has been one 
of the most important instruments for international economic involvement in 
Africa. FDI inflows to Africa in the period of 1991-1994 increased to an average 
of US$3.1 billion from an annual average of US$1.7 billion for the period 1981-
1985. However, in percentage terms these figures do not compare favorably with 
other developing regions where the share of total world FDI moved up from 18% 
in 1987-1991 to 37% in 1994 (UNCTAD, 1999). However, during the same 
period, Africa’ s share continued to stagnate in relative terms. 
 
Global FDI flows increased by six folds during the 1990s, reaching almost US$ 
250 billion by 2000. These flows, however, have been concentrated in a few 
countries with the world’ s top 30 countries accounting for 95% and 90% of the 
total FDI inflows and stocks respectively (UNCTAD, 1999 and 2003). There are a 
number of reasons for this pattern.  Countries with large consumer markets and 
abundant natural endowments attract more MNCs. The recent literature has 
demonstrated that the quality of investment climate plays an important role in 
FDI. Generally, governance can significantly influence the inflow of FDI to 
developing countries’  economic growth (Morisset and Lumenga Neso, 2002; 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000). 
 
FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)3 have traditionally gone to resource-
based sectors. SSA countries, in general, have not been able to attract FDI due to 
their small market size, poor infrastructure, political uncertainty, corruption, and 
restrictive policies toward foreign investment. However, several African countries 
have recently improved the environment for foreign investment and have 
managed to attract FDI inflows toward activities in manufacturing and service 
sectors. During 1991-94 only 21 percent of FDI inflows to SSA went to countries 
                                                 
3
 Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa south of the Sahara Desert, is the term is used to describe those 
countries of Africa that are not part of North Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is also known as Black 
Africa (though some consider this to be a politically incorrect or offensive form).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
that were not major exporters of oil or minerals. The share of FDI inflows to these 
countries rose to about 49 percent in 1995-1999 (Klein et al., 2001). 
 
Table 1. The Share of FDI among Developing Countries, 1996-2000 
(US$ Millions) 
 
year Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
South Asia 
 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
 
SSA Share in 
Percentage 
1996 4,456 3,510 60,970 43,771 3.95 
1997 8,195 4,899 65,057 65,540 5.70 
1998 6,332 3,548 62,997 72,829 4.35 
1999 7,937 3,073 55,899 88,033 5.12 
2000 6,676 3,093 52,130 75,088 4.87 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2002 
 
Table 1 summarizes data on the distribution of FDI to developing countries. SSA 
share is more or less 5% of the total share.  It has been declining from about 19% 
in the 70s and to 9% in the 80s (Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2003). This shows that 
even SSA countries have improved some of the governance attributes, the sub-
region still getting the lowest share especially in the 1990s. For example, in 2000 
foreign investors invested about US$ 6.67 while Latin American and Caribbean 
region and East Asia Pacific US$ 75.1 billion and US$ 52.1 billion respectively. 
 
1.3 The Statement of the Problem 
 
Why are some countries or regions of the world are more globalized than others? 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, social scientists have been focusing on this 
question. More specifically, what has been driving this proliferating research 
agenda is the need to uncover the determinants of globalization, which usually 
refers to international trade and capital flows. The reasons why some developing 
countries, specifically those in sub-Saharan Africa, have been more successful 
than others in attracting foreign investment is the theme of this research. This 
study examines how six governance indicators determine the inflow of FDI in 
SSA. 
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1.4 The Aim of the Research 
  
The aim of the research is to identify the major determining factor for FDI flow to 
SSA’ s recipients’  countries with especial emphasis on the impact of governance 
on FDI. Governance is represented by six sub-indices, which cover a broad range 
of institutional, legal, and policy outcomes.  
 
1.5 Rationale 
 
FDI has become an important source of foreign direct finance to developing 
countries. It is, therefore, important to examine whether there exists a negative or 
a positive relationship between FDI and other macroeconomic variables, including 
governance in a recipient country. It was obvious that Africa has been suffering as 
a result of civil war, political instability, and lack of democracy and good 
governance. But since the late 1990s Africa has been improving in terms of all the 
above governance related factors, which have been hindering economic growth 
and FDI. 
 
While other developing countries have been enjoying a drastic increase in FDI 
Africa has not got a significant chunk out of the inflow. Most of the FDI has been 
going into East Asian countries and since the 1990s to Central and Eastern Europe 
countries (former communist countries). Though there was an increase in FDI in 
the continent in the 1990s, the motive behind investing in Africa is either because 
of the vast natural resources or market size. About 65% of the total investment is 
concentrated in few countries that have tangible assets or/ and large market size 
(Asiedu, 2001). It is evident from previous studies that those countries that lack 
both natural resources and market size are unsuccessful apart from few countries. 
With regards to governance, except for a very few countries there is lack of good 
governance that has as a negative impact on investment, though, there has been a 
significant improvement especially in the rule of law and political stability. 
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1.6 The Importance of the Research 
 
The importance of the research is to see if governance is one of the main 
deterrents for not attracting FDI into Africa. All the previous empirical evidences 
have controversial results on the role of governance, although, with different 
approaches, different variables and different data specifically on governance.  
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter is an introduction that 
discusses the importance and impact of governance on FDI, and patterns and 
trends of FDI flows. Chapter two discusses recent literature on FDI, determinants 
of FDI, and the relationship between economic growth and investment. The third 
chapter describes the model, data and methodology. Chapter four discusses the 
results as well as interpreting and analyzing them. Conclusion will be provided in 
the final chapter, that is, chapter five. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Theoretical Literature on FDI4  
 
The relationship between FDI and growth has motivated a large empirical 
literature focusing on both developed and developing countries. Theoretically, 
there is a view that is bolstered by recent developments in growth theory, which 
highlights the importance of improvement in technology, efficiency, and 
productivity in stimulating growth (Lim, 2001). Both neoclassical and endogenous 
growth models give the basis for most of the empirical work on the FDI-growth 
link (Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2003). Most of the empirical literature on FDI 
and growth are developed from either the neo-classical models of growth or the 
endogenous growth models as a theoretical framework. In the neo-classical 
models of growth, which is based within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, FDI 
increases the volume of investment and / or its efficiency, and leads to long-term 
level effects and medium-term, transitional in growth. The new endogenous 
growth models consider long run growth as a function for technological progress, 
and provide a framework in which FDI can permanently increase the rate of 
growth in the host economy through technology transfer, diffusion and other 
spillover effects (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2000). 
 
As argued by Krugman and Obstfeld (2000), there is another recent theory, which 
attempts to explain the determinants of FDI. This orthodox trade theory asserts 
that the direction and magnitude of capital flows is determined by differences in 
factor proportions among countries, which cannot be addressed by international 
trade. According to this theory, a difference in factor proportions stimulates an 
adjustment of real exchange rates between them and consequently encourages 
                                                 
4
 Lipsey (2001) explained in detail the concept of FDI. He explains FDI from micro (industrial 
organization) and from macro (international finance) perspective. The micro view tries to see the 
motivations for investment in controlled foreign operations, from the investor’ s point of view.  
While the macro tries to see FDI as a particular form of capital flow across national borders, that is 
from home countries to host countries. 
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countries with abundant capital and labour shortages to implement FDI into 
countries that are in the opposite situation. In this case, FDI functions as one way 
to bridge an intertemporal gap of capital demand and supply, and, like other 
capital inflows, increases the production frontier of developing countries, which 
normally suffer a lack of capital. Differences in factor proportions, however, 
cannot be the sole determinant of international capital flows, which seem to be 
highly volatile in comparison to relatively stable factor endowments. Past 
empirical studies, for example, show a strong influence of exchange rates 
movements on FDI. Since changes in exchange rates directly affect factor prices 
(e.g. labour prices) of host countries vis-à-vis home countries, they represent one 
major criterion whereby many MNCs decide their FDI. As factor proportions 
influence exchange rates but only to a modest degree, many other factors that 
affect exchange rates are assumed to influence FDI indirectly (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2000). 
 
Nevertheless, the basic shortcoming of conventional neo-classical growth models, 
as far as FDI is concerned, is that long-run growth can only be achieved by 
technological progress, which is considered to be exogenous. FDI would only 
affect output growth in the short and in the long runs, under the conventional 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital inputs with a given technology; FDI 
would have no permanent impact on output growth. Within the new growth 
framework, FDI is treated as one of the factor inputs along with labour and 
domestic capital and is expected to promote growth in the long run. Whether or 
not technological progress is best described as exogenous to the world as a 
system, the role of FDI in diffusing technology to developing countries appears 
clear. Under either interpretation, technology created in the developed world is 
exogenous to a developing country. Consequently, a positive relationship between 
FDI and long run growth in a developing host country should be expected.  
 
2.1.1 The Effect of FDI in an Economy 
There are two competing views regarding the effect of FDI on domestic 
investment. One is that FDI encourages domestic investment by providing new 
markets, demand for inputs and new technology that spills over into the economy. 
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Labor is mobile and often moves from MNCs to domestic firms; more skilled 
labor may leave a multinational firm to form a start up. There is a belief that FDI 
can serve to increase competition thereby making markets (including financial 
markets) more efficient. Finally investment in new sectors can stimulate the 
growth of new industries and new products. 
 
The opposing view is that FDI crowds out domestic investment by being 
monopolistic competitor. Domestic firms are simply not able to compete with 
foreign firms in terms of their advertising power, ability to dominate the market 
and engage in predatory pricing to prevent entry. Some also believe that FDI 
crowds out domestic investment by raising the demand for credit and 
consequently interest rates as well. Also, if financial inflows are very large, they 
can raise the rate of exchange, making the country’ s exports less attractive. 
However, as suggested by Cotton and Ramachandran (2002) that crowding out is 
not a major problem with regard to FDI. Rather the benefits of FDI are quite 
visible in terms of increased competition, efficiency and innovation.  
 
2.1.2 FDI and Economic Growth  
The contribution of FDI to economic growth has been debated quite extensively in 
the literature. The traditional argument is that an inflow of FDI improves 
economic growth by increasing the capital stock, whereas recent literature points 
to the role of FDI as a channel of international technology as well (Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2000). Furthermore FDI as an important source of capital, 
complements domestic private investment, is usually associated with new job 
opportunities, and in most cases is related to the enhancement of technology 
transfer and overall boosts economic growth in host countries. 
 
Theoretically, this view has become bolstered by recent developments in growth 
theory, which highlights the importance of improvements in technology, 
efficiency, and productivity in stimulating growth. In this regard, FDI’ s 
contribution to growth comes through its role as a medium for transferring 
advanced technology from the industrialized to the developing economies. 
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Both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that FDI has a beneficial 
impact on developing host countries. The importance of FDI is becoming obvious 
to economic growth of developing countries because these countries are unable to 
achieve the needed growth with their domestic investments. Hence, it is becoming 
obvious to policy makers in those countries that FDI really assists economic 
growth. This can be done through employment creation, technology transfer, 
managerial skills, increasing local market, create export capacity and corporate 
tax (Asiedu, 2003; 2001; Loungani and Razan, 2001). Beyond promoting growth, 
FDI has other potentially desirable features that affect the quality of growth and 
assist with poverty reduction (Klein et al., 2001; Jenkins and Thomas, 2002). 
 
The entry of a foreign investor (mostly MNCs) is not simply import of capital in 
another country. FDI is one of the channels for international knowledge and 
technology transfer. Technology transfer is considered to occur in the following 
way: in order to compete with more informed domestic firms, foreign investor 
should posses more advanced technology, managerial or marketing skills. Thus, 
locally owned firms may have the opportunity to appropriate knowledge and 
technology developed by parent MNC and transferred to the MNC’ s affiliates 
increases competition in local markets and forces the domestic firms to enhance 
their efficiency in order to protect their market shares and profits. These and other 
various externalities, caused by FDI to the domestic firms, are often called 
spillovers5. 
 
2.1.3 The Spillover Effect of FDI 
Spillovers may occur as the results of labor turnover from MNC’ s affiliates to the 
domestic firms, demonstration effect, rise in competition and technical support of 
supplies and customers. Various studies show that the existence of spillovers is 
not predetermined and not guaranteed but it depends on some technological and 
economic factors. One of them is the difference between foreign and domestic 
technology level, the so-called technology–gap. Economic literature suggests that 
the larger is the technology gap between home and host economy, the larger 
becomes the potential for imitation of technologies, which induces economic 
                                                 
5
 For a more detailed discussion on spillovers see also Blomstrom and Kokko (2003). 
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growth. However, if the technology gap between foreign and local firms is too 
large, spillovers may not occur. This can be explained by the fact that 
technologies developed in more industrialized countries may be less suited for 
conditions in developing countries, because their implementation may require 
enormous expenditure. Other factors are the values of underlying technology, 
competition in the markets, etc.  
 
FDI has various effects in an economy of a host country including growth effect. 
In theory, there are a variety of channels through which FDI can promote 
economic growth, especially in the host economy. Perhaps the most important one 
is technology transfer and spillovers. The economic growth literature has 
established the importance of technological progress in economic development. 
FDI often leads to technology transfer to affiliates of multinational firms in host 
countries. Spillovers can occur through MNCs’  interaction with domestic 
suppliers and customers or through worker mobility. Therefore, FDI can have an 
impact on income. 
 
Hermes and Lensink (2000) identify and distinguish spillovers in different forms. 
The following channels, through which spillovers of FDI may take place, have 
been distinguished: (1) demonstration and/or imitation, (2) competition, (3) 
linkages, and (4) training (see also Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003:10). 
 
Spillovers through the demonstration channel emphasizes that technologies used 
by foreign firms are more advanced than those used by domestic firms, and that 
these domestic firms may imitate the newer technologies, which will make them 
more productive. The same may hold for managerial practices introduced by 
foreign firms. The demonstration effect may take place through direct or indirect 
contact between firms or through labor turnovers from foreign to domestic firms. 
The more backward the technological level in the host country in comparison to 
the level used by the foreign firms, the more domestic firms may profit from 
imitating and copying these technologies. This appears to reflect the idea of 
convergence of technological skills. 
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The competition channel stresses that the entrance of foreign firms intensifies 
competition in the domestic market. This forces domestic firms to become more 
efficient, which may lead to upgrading existing technology, or developing (or 
copying) new technologies and management skills. 
 
The linkage channel of spillovers stresses the fact that MNCs may transfer new 
technology to domestic firms through transactions with these firms. Such 
transactions may, for example, be in terms of the purchase of raw materials or 
intermediate goods. This may lead to intensive buyer-seller relations with 
domestic firms in the host country, and as part of these relations foreign firms may 
provide technical assistance and training to local linkage firms. Moreover, selling 
to foreign firms may encourage domestic firms to upgrade the production process 
based on the technical and quality requirements demanded by the foreign buyers, 
increasing their productivity. 
 
Finally, the training channel emphasizes that the introduction of new technologies, 
and domestic firms copying them, needs to be supported by an upgrading of the 
human capital available domestically. Domestic firms can only adopt these new 
technologies when the labor force is able to work with them. Therefore, local 
firms may be stimulated to train their own employees when foreign firms enter the 
market. This stimulus may be based on one of the other three channels discussed. 
Thus, perceived opportunities to copy newly introduced technologies, increased 
competition in domestic markets and/or the existence or development of linkages 
between foreign and domestic firms may lead to increasing training efforts by 
domestic firms. The latter point also makes clear that in practice it will be rather 
difficult to separate the four channels of spillovers. 
The role of FDI as a source of capital has become increasingly important to SSA. 
The reason is that in order for the continent to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal (DMG)6 of reducing poverty rates by half, the region needs to 
fill an annual gap of US$64 billion, about 12% of GDP. Since income levels and 
domestic savings in the region are low, a bulk of the finance will have to come 
                                                 
6
 DMG is a development goal set for Africa by the UN to reduce poverty by 50 percent in 2015. 
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from abroad - official finance or from private foreign investment. However, 
official assistance to the region has been declining. In addition, FDI is unavailable 
to most African countries; most of the countries in the region cannot raise funds 
from international capital markets. As a consequence, a bulk of the external 
resources needed to alleviation has to come from FDI (Asiedu, 2003). 
 
2.2 FDI and Governance 
 
Good governance is now acknowledged as an important pre-requisite for well 
functioning markets of countries and, hence, for attractive investment conditions 
and a sustainable allocation of investment capital. A number of multilateral 
organizations have reflected on the elements of good governance, and on their 
relation to investment for development. As the culture and experience of these 
organizations vary, so, too, do their perceptions of what constitutes good 
governance. 
 
The key dimensions of governance include: rule of law, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, control of corruption, regulatory quality and political 
stability (Kaufmann et al., 2003). Moreover, good governance includes sound 
democratic principles in political life of a country and consultation procedures 
with the private sector and other civil society stakeholders to ensure that laws are 
consistent with practical life and compatible with the needs and possibilities of the 
firms and the economy in general. 
 
A system of governance that is not functioning properly can be easily identified 
by various signs, regardless of the specific historic-cultural context of each 
country: corruption, squandering of environmental resources, loss of public 
confidence in the government, non-respect of constitutional rights, etc. This 
usually leads to sub-optimal utilization of the country’ s human and financial 
resources.  
 
Given the relative irreversibility of FDI, unnecessary uncertainties about 
legislative action and rules and enforcement act as major impediments, by giving 
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rise to risk premiums in general and by raising fears of discriminatory treatment. 
A non-transparent host country business environment raises information costs, 
diverts corporate energies toward rent-seeking activities and may give rise to 
outright crime such as corruption. While this weighs down on the entire host 
country business sector, it arguably acts as more of a discouragement to outsiders 
who are not privy to locally available information. All companies, domestic and 
foreign alike, on an equal footing, should be able to know in what conditions they 
operate and to prepare themselves sufficiently in advance, when changes are 
upcoming. 
 
Among the elements of the enabling environment that can be influenced by 
policies, transparency is arguably the single most important one. Many studies 
suggest that companies may be willing to invest into countries with legal and 
regulatory frameworks that would not otherwise be considered as "investor 
friendly" provided they are able to obtain a reasonable degree of clarity about the 
environment in which they will be operating. Conversely, there appears to be 
certain threshold levels for transparency beneath which the business conditions 
become so opaque that virtually no investor is willing to enter, regardless of the 
extent of the inducement. 
 
Transparency in government decision-making and public policy implementation is 
important because it facilitates governmental accountability, participation, and 
predictability of outcomes. To achieve transparency, there is a need for clear and 
enforceable rules and procedures, which are preferable to those that provide 
discretionary powers to government officials or that are susceptible to different 
interpretations. Accountability is needed to make sure that rules are actually 
complied with. Similarly, transparency and information openness cannot be 
assured without legal frameworks that balance the right to disclosure against the 
right of confidentiality, and without institutions that accept accountability. 
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2.2.1 Governance in Developing Countries 
 
Dethier (1999) defined governance as “the science of government behaviour and 
performance including the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority to manage a country’ s affair at all level”. Furthermore governance refers 
to existing institutions and policies in a country. It is widely argued that a 
country’ s economic performance overtime is determined to a great extent by its 
political, institutional and legal environment (OECD, 2001). Hamdok (2001:1), in 
addition, broadly defined governance 
“…  includes a broad range of obligations including the 
establishment and maintenance of law and order, creating 
transparent administrative structures, extending social 
infrastructure to the rural areas, protecting poor and vulnerable 
groups and including them in the decision- making process and the 
preservation of the peace.” 
 
The potential relevance of governance to explaining FDI flows across countries 
has been indirectly suggested by Lucas (1990), who addresses the question of why 
capital flows from rich to poor countries do not take place in the world economy 
until capital to labor ratios and, hence, wages and capital returns are equalized. He 
considers a number of possible explanations and rejects several prominent 
explanations on conceptual grounds, including the possibility that technological 
change makes capital substantially more productive in developed countries. An 
explanation that he considers quite plausible is the efforts of host country 
governments to appropriate economic rents associated with inward foreign direct 
investment through instruments such as heavy taxation. He offers this as a 
possible explanation for relatively low rates of capital formation in developed 
countries in the face of substantial factor price differences between developed and 
developing countries. While Lucas identifies explicit policies that are targeted at 
foreign investors, other governance policies that discourage domestic capital 
investment may also be relevant factors influencing inter-country differences in 
economic performance.  
 
In general, however, he highlights an argument that capital flows cannot be 
predicted by looking exclusively at labor and capital scarcity. There is a relatively 
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extensive empirical literature focusing on the characteristics of locations that 
seems to either attract or repel foreign investors. While it seems plausible that FDI 
will be attracted to regions characterized by more favorable governance 
infrastructures, all other things constant, most of the relevant literature has 
focused on economic determinants of FDI inflows. It is, of course, true that the 
international business literature has acknowledged the importance of country-
specific political risk. As a consequence, empirical analyses of FDI now routinely 
include some kind of variable to control for inter-country differences in the broad 
political environment, albeit with somewhat mixed results. 
 
However, it is difficult to generalize about the statistical impact of political 
governance attributes, in part because the attributes are measured in different 
ways in different studies. Moreover, although many previous studies adopt 
measures that are closely related to the idea of governance infrastructure, there has 
yet been no systematic attempt to directly relate governance infrastructure 
measures to FDI flows for a wide cross-section of countries. Nor has there been 
much discussion regarding the specific infrastructure elements that are especially 
robust determinants of FDI. 
 
The point of departure is that good governance is a requirement for sustainable 
development in Africa. Growth and development require a predictable regulatory 
administration and an effective and transparent public administration and an 
independent judiciary. However, while it is important for the state to strive to 
recreate a growth and development-enhancing environment, it should be realized 
that the attainment of good governance is a process (Hamdok, 2001). 
 
Broadly speaking, governance infrastructure comprises public institutions and 
policies created by governments as a framework for economic and social 
relations. We are most concerned with those elements of the governance 
infrastructure that can affect the investment decisions of MNCs. A “positive” 
governance infrastructure would therefore include: an effective, impartial and 
transparent legal system that protects property and individual rights; public 
institutions that are stable, credible and honest; and government policies that favor 
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free and open markets. These conditions encourage FDI and presumably private 
domestic investment as well, by protecting privately held assets from arbitrary 
direct or indirect appropriation. In a related manner, the same conditions 
encourage sunk cost investments by MNCs that facilitate efficient operation in 
host countries. 
 
Governance infrastructure, so conceived, can be contrasted with physical 
infrastructure and human capital. Physical infrastructure is conventionally thought 
to include investments in the construction and maintenance of communications, 
transportation and utility networks. Human capital reflects less tangible 
investments in people, mainly in the form of education and health. To the extent 
that education and health are provided by government or influenced by public 
policy, human capital may be thought of as human infrastructure.  
 
2.3 An Empirical Literature on FDI  
 
Using panel data in a test for 69 developing countries Borensztein, De Gregrio 
and Lee (1998) find that while FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technology, and a positive contributor to economic growth, its impact is greater 
the higher the level of human capital stock in the host economy. While 
Balasubramanyan, Salisu and Sapsford (1996) employ a cross-country procedure 
to analyze 46 developing countries in 1970-85. The evidence regarding the 
importance of a certain threshold of the host’ s human capital, in addition, finds 
that FDI’ s growth contribution is significantly greater in outward-oriented or 
neutral trade regimes compared to those pursuing import-substituting strategies. 
2.4 The Determinants of FDI  
 
An immense literature on the determinants of FDI in developing countries clearly 
suggests the importance of infrastructure, market size, human capital, 
macroeconomic stability and sound institutional framework for attracting FDI 
flows (see for example, Singh and Jun, 1995; Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2003; 
Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Morisset, 2000). 
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Although there is no complete theory available on the determinants of FDI, two 
sets of forces are usually suggested as important in influencing investment 
decisions of foreign companies: those external to the firm and those internal to the 
firm. The internal factors to the firm include management, organization, structure 
and production technology that may help determine the ownership of production. 
The external factors include interaction country characteristics, such as 
government policy, availability of resources and infrastructure, all of which may 
help explain the desirability of producing a product or providing a service 
(financial or non-financial) in a particular country (Mbekeani, 1997; Lipsey, 
2001).  
2.4.1 Market Size 
Size of markets and sustained growth of markets are obvious attractions to profit 
maximizing firms. Most statistical studies on the determinants of FDI, in 
developing countries, indicate the importance of size of markets 
(Balasubramanyan et al., 1996). The theory underlying this proposition is that 
firms, which possess advantages such as a new technique of production or 
ownership advantages, require sizeable markets both at home and abroad in order 
to maximize returns to their investments in generating the unique advantages they 
possess. Although markets abroad can be serviced through exports, tariffs and 
trade restrictions may be a barrier to exporting. In addition, the physical presence 
of the firm in the market would facilitate acquisition of market intelligence. 
Investments that are attracted to host countries because of the size of markets are 
known as market seeking investments (Dunning, 1993; Asiedu, 2003).  
 
It should be noted also that not all FDI is domestic market oriented. Dunning, in 
his seminal work, classified investment that attracts size of markets into market, 
resources, and efficiency- seeking investments. There are also export market 
oriented investments both in relatively large countries such as China and small 
economies such as Mauritius. The attraction of these countries for foreign firms is 
their resource endowments including cheap but efficient labor. Investments which 
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seek such endowments are referred to as resource seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993; 
Asiedu, 2002).  
 
Yet another variety of FDI referred by Dunning as efficiency seeking FDI, may 
also respond to relatively low wage costs in developing countries. Efficiency 
seeking investments consolidate and rationalize market seeking and resource 
seeking investments which companies may have undertaken in the past. Such 
investments may result in an international division of labor, with capital intensive 
segments of the production processes and products located in the developed 
countries and the labor-intensive processes and components located in the 
developing countries. In some cases, FDI may be undertaken in locations with 
cheap labor for the assembly of components and parts. It should be noted that in 
these types of labor seeking investments it is not just low wage costs, but it is the 
efficiency wage or low wages coupled with relatively high productivity which 
counts in the investment decision process of foreign firms. 
2.4.2 Physical Infrastructure 
The significance of infrastructure facilities as a determinant of FDI needs no 
elaboration. Infrastructure facilities are to be defined broadly in this context to 
include not only transportation and communications but also a favourable 
environment for work and leisure. These are vital for any sort of investments be 
they are foreign or domestic.   
2.4.3 Macroeconomic Stability 
Low inflation rates and stable exchange rates are important determinants of FDI 
for more than one reason. First, they attest to the stability and the underlying 
strength of the economy. Second, they provide a degree of certainty relating to the 
future course of the economy and impart confidence in the ability of firms to 
repatriate profits and dividends. Weak economies with high levels of domestic 
borrowing and debt, measured by the ratio of budget deficits to GDP and total 
volume of borrowing to GDP, are often compelled to institute exchange controls 
and controls on the capital account of the balance of payments. Third, more often 
a stable macro economic environment also implies a stable political environment. 
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Political and economic stability are usually intertwined (Balasubramanyan et al., 
1996). 
 
2.4.4 Trade Openness 
The main contribution of standard theories of international trade is that free trade 
is a positive sum game; it confers gains on all the trading partners (see Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 2000). The gains are two fold; specialization gains and exchange 
gains The former arise from allocation of resources and specialization in 
production based on comparative advantage of the trading countries and the latter 
from an opportunity to trade at a set of prices different from that in autarchy. 
Standard trade theories also demonstrate that in general policy induced 
interference in free trade in the form of tariffs and quotas on imports would result 
in misallocation of resources and loss of efficiency gains from trade. Resources 
will move from the production of exportables into the protected and the relatively 
profitable importables.  
 
Restrictions on imports may, however, induce inflows of foreign capital, including 
FDI, into the production of importables. The issue then is whether or not such 
tariff jumping variety of FDI is socially efficient from the point of view of the 
host countries. The consensus on the issue is that whilst such tariff jumping FDI 
may be profitable, from the point of view of the foreign firms it may not be 
socially profitable for the host country. Foreign firms would enjoy markets 
sheltered from import competition and reap substantial rewards for their 
investments. The host country, however, would lose because of (a) presence of 
FDI in areas of activity in which it does not possess comparative advantage (b) 
protection induced misallocation of domestic resources away from lines of 
activity in which it enjoys a comparative advantage and loss of specialization 
gains from trade (c) payment of profits to foreign owned factors of production. 
 
Admittedly, FDI in the import competing industries may contribute to skill 
formation and technological change. But these sorts of dynamic gains from FDI 
are uncertain. Foreign firms would have little incentive to invest in development 
of skills and technology in the presence of highly profitable markets, sheltered 
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from international competition. FDI can generate dynamic advantages only in the 
presence of an appropriate climate for investment, which is free of factor and 
product market distortions. 
 
Several statistical studies endorse the proposition that the tariff jumping variety of 
FDI not only results in the importation of technologies which are not appropriate 
to factor endowments of host countries but also results in social rates of returns, 
which are well below the private rates of returns to foreign investors 
(Balasubramanyan et al., 1996). In other words, the country would have been 
better off importing the products than making them at home with the tariff 
jumping variety of FDI. 
 
In general, FDI which exploits the natural comparative advantage, which host 
countries possess, contributes to efficient resource allocation and specialization 
and trade. This is not to say that the only variety of FDI, which is socially 
efficient, is of the trade promoting variety. It is just that allocation of FDI between 
import competing activities and export promoting activities should be guided by 
comparative advantage and market forces free of policy induced distortions. This 
shows that FDI is much more effective in EP (export promoting) countries than in 
IS (import substitution) countries, but this doesn’ t rule out production by foreign 
firms for the domestic market provided that such investment are guided by 
distortion of free market forces. Statistical evidence in support of this proposition 
is robust (see Balasubramanyan et al., 1996). 
 
2.4.5 Human Capital 
The development literature emphasizes technology transfers as a central aspect of 
take-off and convergence of growth rates. Arguably the most important channel of 
technology transfer is FDI. While theoretical models of FDI and firm location 
focus largely on technology and physical capital, recent empirical evidence 
underscores that the success of technology transfer via FDI depends crucially on 
the size of the developing country's human capital stock (Borensztein et al., 
1998). In addition, Borensztein et al. (1998) documents that large share of FDI 
occurs among nations with similar technology and human capital levels. 
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There is a general consensus that FDI contributes to economic growth by 
stimulating technological progress. In recent years, there is a growing view that 
FDI is positively correlated with growth. In theory, there are a variety of channels 
through which FDI can promote economic growth, especially in the host 
economy. Perhaps the most important one is technology transfer and spillovers. 
The economic growth literature has established the importance of technological 
progress in economic development. FDI often leads to technology transfer to 
affiliates of MNCs in host countries. Spillovers can also occur through MNCs’  
interaction with domestic suppliers and customers or through worker mobility. 
Therefore, FDI can have an impact on income. 
 
Borensztein et al. (1998) present a model where FDI has a significant impact on 
economic growth of developing countries via technology transfer. This model is 
based on the assumption that foreign investors operating on domestic market 
make adoption of new technology easier for local firms and thus promote 
technological progress and growth. However, in order to benefit from technology 
transfer, domestic firms should have sufficient absorptive capability that is a 
minimum threshold stock of human capital. 
 
2.4.6 Governance 
Recent empirical findings tend to confirm the impact of governance on FDI is 
significant. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) found that investments in governance 
infrastructure not only attract foreign capital but also create the conditions under 
which MNCs invest in a host country. Because the investment environment of a 
country affects both domestic and foreign investors, and because FDI has been 
shown to promote host country efficiency. It is a natural extension of the literature 
to consider the impact of governance infrastructure on cross-country differences 
in FDI flows. 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
 
Theoretical models of investment suggest several determinants of investment 
behaviour. At the aggregate level, the early accelerator theory of investment 
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captured the dependence of investment on expected returns. According to 
accelerator model, investment is related linearly to past changes in output. Output 
growth rates are expected to persist through time and no account is taken of the 
influence of the cost of capital on the investment decision. The neo-classical 
theory of investment, which followed, addressed the latter shortcoming but 
continued to assume that output was determined outside the model. According to 
the neo-classical model, investment spending depends on the user cost of capital 
and is geared to maintaining the optimal capital stock and an associated level of 
output. 
 
There are some approaches which develop hypotheses about country risk and 
investment with simple models of macroeconomic equilibrium. Another 
hypothesis is that openness to trade, through the discipline of international market, 
is a way of improving the credibility of government policies. This, in turn, lowers 
country risk and increases investment. An additional hypothesis is that income 
inequality, by fuelling social unrest, increases socio-political instability. The later, 
by creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, reduces investment. 
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CHAPTER III: DATA, MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC    
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Panel Data Econometrics 
 
Hsiao (2003) defined panel data set as “one that follows a given sample of 
individual’ s overtime and thus provides multiple observations on each individual 
in the sample”. It has become widely available in both developed countries and 
developing countries. Nowadays it has also become increasingly important in 
developing countries. In these countries, there may not have a long tradition of 
statistical collection. Panel data sets for economic research possess several major 
advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets. Panel data 
usually give you a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom 
and reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables, hence improving the 
efficiency of econometric estimates (Hsiao, 2003). 
 
The development of panel data econometrics in recent years has lead to the 
expansion of the range of economic and financial models where the panel data 
model is applicable. The development has been mainly achieved in the panel data 
model dealing with the case of a large number of individuals and a small number 
of time-series observations. In addition, the development has predominantly 
grown out of introducing the GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) proposed 
by Hansen (1982). The GMM, including the IV (Instrumental Variable) method, 
allows the implementation of consistent estimations for the panel data model 
based on conditional expectations and the dynamic panel data model, which we 
cannot estimate consistently in the framework of traditional estimation techniques 
such as the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) and the LSDV (Least Squares Dummy 
Variable) estimators. Furthermore, it is recognized that the GMM is applicable to 
accomplish consistent estimations for the count panel data model and the structure 
of the variance in the panel data model. Until now, a great deal of empirical 
studies in economics and finance were implemented in parallel with the 
development of the estimation techniques. 
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3.1.1 Balanced vs. Unbalanced Panels 
 
1. Balanced panels are panels, where we collect for each individual (n) an 
observation at each period (T) of the study. Thus we have a total of nxT 
observations. This may be the case when we collect data on regions in a country 
over time as regions usually do not disappear or new regions enter the country. 
2. Unbalanced panels instead are panels, where we do not collect data for an 
individual at each period of the study. This is typical for household panels. The 
reason is that it is not always possible to interview all household members. They 
may just disappear, refuse to take part in an interview, some die, children, for 
example, grow old enough to be interviewed for the first time, but have not been 
interviewed since the beginning of the panel study. So, the number of 
observations per respondent Ti may vary and the total number of observations is 
Σni=tTi ≠  nT. 
3.1.2 Advantages of Panel Data 
 
According to Hsiao (2003), there are many important advantages of panel data 
compared to time series or cross- sectional data sets is that it allows identification 
of certain parameters or questions without the need to make restrictive 
assumption. And these main advantages are (Hsiao, 2003; Baltaghi, 2002): 
1. Efficiency of parameters 
Because panel data sets are typically larger than cross-sectional or time series data 
sets and explanatory variables. They vary over two dimensions (individual and 
time) rather than one. Estimators based on panel data are quite often more 
accurate than from other sources. 
2. Identification of parameters 
Panel data reduces identification problems. Although this advantage may come 
under different headings, in many cases it involves identification in the presence 
of endogenous regressors or measurement error, robustness to omitted variables 
and the identification of individual dynamics. 
3. Controlling for individual heterogeneity  
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Panel data suggest that individual firms, states, or countries are heterogeneous. 
Time series and cross section studies not controlling for the heterogeneity run the 
risk of obtaining biased results. 
4. The dynamics of adjustment 
Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment. Cross- sectional 
distributions that look relatively stable hide a multitude of changes. 
5. Panel data allows us to construct and test more complicated behavioral models 
than purely cross-section or time series data.  
 
3.1.3 Panel Data Regression Models  
A panel data regression differs from a regular time-series or cross- section 
regression in that it has a double subscript on its variables, i.e. 
 
Yit  ;’it Xit                    i =1,….., N;  t = 1,……..,T                             (3.1) 
 
with i denoting observations and t denoting time. The i subscript, therefore 
denotes the cross- section dimension whereas t denotes the time series dimension. 
LVDVFDODU LV.[DQG;it is the itth observation on K explanatory variables. 
Most of the panel data applications utilize one-way error component model for the 
disturbances, with 
                   uit i+vit                                                                                           (3.2) 
where i denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and vit denotes the 
remainder disturbance. Note that i is time-invariant and accounts for any 
individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression. In this case we 
could think of it as the individual’ s unobserved ability. The remainder disturbance 
vit varies with individuals and time and can be thought of as the usual disturbance 
in the regression. In vector form (3.1) can be written as 
\ NT; X = X                                                               (3.3) 
:KHUH\LV17[;LV17[.= > NT;@ ¶  ¶ ¶DQG NT is a vector of 
ones of dimension NT. Equation (3.2) can also be written as 
                  u = Z Y 
where u’ = (u11,… … … … , u1T, u21,… … ., uN1,… … ., uNT) with the observations 
stacked such that the slower index is over individuals and the faster index is over 
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time. Z  = IN   T  is an identity matrix of dimension 1 T is a vector of ones 
dimension T and denotes Kronecker product. Z  is a selector matrix on ones and 
zeros, or simply the matrix of individual dummies that may include in the 
regression to estimate the L if they are assumed to be fixed parameters. 
3.1.3.1 Fixed Effect Model 
This model restricts the coefficients on x to be common across t and i. A less 
restricted form could allow the slopes to vary over time, across donor-recipient 
SDLUVRUERWK7KHDVVXPSWLRQPDGHDERXW i has implications for the consistency 
and HIILFLHQF\ SURSHUWLHV RI HVWLPDWHV RI  LQ HTXDWLRQ . In an aid to trade 
equation the group-specific term reflects idiosyncratic preferences or 
characteristics of a donor-recipient pair. If the group-specific effect is assumed 
constant (but allowed to differ across units) the model is called a fixed effects 
(FE) model. Assuming heterogeneity across units equation (3.1) implies that the 
effect of all omitted variables is the same for a given cross sectional unit through 
time but varies across cross-sectional units for a given point in time. 
3.1.3.2 Random Effect Model 
The second estimator makes use of the idea that heterogeneity across units can be 
accounted for by treating the individual specific effects as random variables. Here 
the assumption is that the unit specific effects cannot be observed or measured and 
so represents ‘specific ignorance’  for the modeller and must be treated as part of 
our ‘general ignorance’ .  What this means is that the large number of factors that 
affect the value of the dependent variable but which are not explicitly accounted 
for in the model can be summarized by a random disturbance. If this assumption is 
made then we call it a random effects (RE) model. Hence in addition to a non-
specific error term vit    there is also a group-specific error term i. Equation (3.1) 
is, therefore, written as 
 
Yit =µ i  i + X’it Yit 
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3.2 Sampling and Source of Data 
 
We took a sample of 36 countries drawn from the SSA based on convenience 
(availability of data). Our main data sources are the World Bank’ s World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (both 2002, CD-ROM 
version), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, Word Investment Report, various issues). Data on governance was 
obtained from World Bank and was prepared by Kaufmann et al. (2003) from 
1996-2002 on biennials. The data was annualized to fit with the rest of the data 
set. This was calculated by taking the average of the previous and preceding years 
for the sample period.  
  
3.2.1 Data Description 
 
The thesis employs panel data of 36 countries in SSA for the period of 1996-2000 
to analyze the impact of governance on FDI flows. The governance indicators data 
was made available since 1996 on biennial bases. Kaufmann et al. (2003) 
estimated and indexed the governance data and categorized them into six sub 
indices from various sources. The sub-indices are: 
 
1. Voice and accountability 
2. Political stability 
3. Government effectiveness 
4. Regulatory quality 
5. Rule of law 
6. Control of corruption  
 
All these indices have been estimated from 31 different qualitative indicators from 
13 different sources. Measurement error is the main drawback of these aggregate 
indicators of governance. These aggregates drawn from a variety of sources do not 
provide more precise measures of governance than individual indicators. The rest 
of the other variables are obtained from the World Bank’ s WDI CD-ROM (2002). 
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3.3 The Econometric Model 
 
FDI= f (market size, trade openness, physical infrastructure, governance, 
macroeconomic stability). 
FDI is the dependent variable and is represented by the ratio of FDI to real GDP. 
The independent variables are: 
o Market size is measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita 
o Trade openness is measured by the ratio of trade (import + export) 
to GDP 
o Physical infrastructure is measured by the telephone lines per 1000    
population 
o Governance is measured by other six sub-indices (see in the above 
subtopic) 
o Macroeconomic instability is measured by annual average inflation 
rate 
o Human capital is measured by secondary school enrolment. 
 
The model developed to assess the impact of governance on the FDI inflow to sub 
Saharan Africa. The model has three components: the dependent variable, that is, 
FDI, vector of exogenous variables and the vector governance indices7.  
 
Ln FDIit = c + α ln GDPPERCAPITAit + β ln CPIit + γ ln INFRAit + η ln OPENNESSit +λ ln SEC 
it + ϕ ln RETURNit + µ ln GOVit 
 
Where i is individual country and t is the year 
Ln       = log 
GDPPERCAPITA = market size 
CPI   = rate of inflation 
INFRA  = physical infrastructure 
                                                 
7
 µ ln GOVit  represents all the governance indices. These are regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, political stability, rule of law, government effectiveness, and control of corruption. 
The indices are estimated individual against the other independent variables. As a result we have 
six estimates. 
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OPENNESS  = trade openness 
SEC   =  human capital 
RETURN  = rate of return on investment 
GOV   = vector of governance indices 
 
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the ratio of FDI to real GDP for country i at time t.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Market size: the size of the host market affects the amount of FDI flows. Large 
markets are more likely to attract FDI due to an expected stream of future returns. 
Conversely, small market size for some developing countries is considered as 
deterring FDI. Following conventional measure of market size, GDP will be used 
in constant US dollar. 
Economic growth: economic growth is often found to significantly induce FDI 
inflows into a country (see Jun and Singh, 1996). Profit-maximizing foreign 
investors are attracted to fast growing economies in order to take advantage of 
future market opportunities. Growth is measured by the annual percentage of 
growth rate of GDP and is expected to affect FDI positively. 
Inflation rate: as in many research, inflation is taken as a proxy to macroeconomic 
stability and is measured by annual percentage general price increase in the 
economies. Inflation is expected to affect GDI negatively. 
Trade openness: many researches show that openness affects FDI positively. The 
measure used in the trade openness is the share of trade to GDP.  
Secondary school enrolment: is used as a proxy to human capital. This is 
measured as the number of secondary school pupil per 1000 population.  
Physical infrastructure: good infrastructure increases the productivity of 
investments and therefore stimulates FDI. As in many empirical studies, the 
member of telephones per 1000 population is used as a proxy to physical 
infrastructure. The expected estimated sign is positive. 
Governance indices:  the concept of governance cannot be measured by one 
index; thus the World Bank has developed six sub indices to account for the 
governance. 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
¾ Voice and accountability 
¾ Political stability 
¾ Government effectiveness 
¾ Regulatory quality 
¾ Rule of law 
¾ Control of corruption  
 
All these indices have been estimated from 31 different qualitative indicators from 
13 different sources and are subject to measurement error (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003). Singh and Jun (1995) indicate their concern on the reliability of 
governance data. 
 
3.4 The Estimation Technique 
 
Fixed effect panel estimation is employed in estimating the model. The first 
reason is that it allows us to focus on changes with different units overtime. 
Second, the estimates remain unbiased even when data is missing for some time 
period for some cross-sectional units (see Asiedu, 2003). In this case, the panel 
data of 36 countries in SSA is considered.  
 
A GLS fixed effect estimation technique is used in determining the impact of 
governance on FDI with some other controlling (independent) variables. FDI is 
regressed with every sub-index on the governance variables. As a result FDI is 
regressed against the six governance sub-indices along side the other controlling 
variables. We regressed the same variables in every estimation. We have six 
regression estimates. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32 
CHAPTER IV: EMPIRICAL REUSLTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The FDI model is estimated based on 36 unbalanced panel data of SSA countries 
for the period of 1996-2002 using fixed effect panel data econometric techniques. 
The model estimated is: 
 
Ln FDIit = c + α ln GDPPERCAPITAit + β ln CPIit + γ ln INFRAit + η ln OPENNESSit +λ ln SEC 
it + ϕ ln RETURNit + µ ln GOVit 
 
Table 2: Summarized results of the governance indices 
  Coefficient t- statistic 
Control of corruption -0.140350 -3.546421 
Government effectiveness -0.379160 -9.594779 
Rule of law -0.419545 -8.278264 
Regulatory quality 0.686652 3.068405 
Political stability 0.060903 0.453380 
Voice & accountability 0.471045 7.779443 
 
 
The purpose of the research is to estimate the effect of governance on FDI and to 
investigate the way through which good governance may be helpful to FDI. 
Particular emphasis was given to the governance variables, which are believed to 
be the main hindrance along other determinants in the sub-continent. The 
empirical results are summarized in the above table which shows the coefficient 
and the t-statistic, as well as the signs (see Appendix). The above table presents 
the results for the six governance variables. Most of the variables have the 
expected signs. Corruption, government ineffectiveness and lack of rule of law 
have a negative but significant effect on FDI on SSA while regulatory quality, 
political stability and accountability were positive but also significant with the 
exception of political stability. This is consistent with Schneider and Frey (1985) 
findings. In their empirical study they find a negative relationship between 
political stability and FDI. The results are also consistent with Naude and Krugell 
(2003), who used a different approach and econometric technique. 
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Naude and Krugell (2003), using the same Kaufmann et al. (2003) data set 
employed, find that most of the governance indicators are significant, apart from 
the regulatory burden and corruption and graft, which are not significant. 
Furthermore, they find out that only political stability has the right sign, indicating 
a negative relationship between political stability and FDI. The rest of the sub-
indices accountability, rule of law, and government effectiveness show that more 
FDI has been taking place in countries with poor governance.  
 
In addition, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) find out that the size of a national 
economy strongly conditions how attractive that location is to foreign investors. 
They also strongly support the notion that governance infrastructure has an 
important and direct influence on FDI. An additional influence suggested by them 
was that FDI would be more strongly affected by improvements in political 
governance in developing countries than in developed countries. Of the 
governance indicators, their evidence suggests that regulatory burden and 
government effectiveness are the most important determinants of FDI flows from 
all countries (both developed and developing countries). 
 
While Morisset (2000) finds that the most important features of countries 
successfully attracting FDI are strong economic growth and aggressive trade 
liberalization. The above two empirical studies are consistent with the estimates in 
this research. Trade openness represented by the ratio of total trade to GDP is 
significant and positive determinants of FDI. Market size represented by GDP per 
capita is highly significant and positive in all the six estimates. In vast empirical 
studies market size has a significant and positive impact on FDI flows (see for 
example Asiedu, 2003; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Naude and Krugell, 2003; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Borensztein et al., 1998). 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION  
 
This mini-thesis has examined the determinants of FDI with especial emphasis to 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In general, good governance has a partial 
impact on FDI with respect to SSA. The econometric estimates show that 
corruption, government ineffectiveness and lack of rule of law has a negative 
effect while political stability, good regulatory quality and accountability has a 
positive impact. One also should consider that trade openness, human capital and 
high GDP per capita has a positive impact. Correspondingly FDI has a positive 
overall effect on economic growth, although the magnitude of this effect depends 
on the stock of human capital available in the host economy. 
 
The nature and the interaction of FDI with human capital in countries with very 
low levels of human capital, however, has a direct negative effect on FDI 
(Borensztein et al., 1998). Additionally, this paper finds out that macroeconomic 
instability has also a negative impact in the sub-continent. In the 1990s SSA 
countries have shown an improvement in institutions that promote economic 
growth in general and FDI specifically due to largely the introduction of multi- 
party democracy. These countries can only attract FDI by curbing corruption, 
developing more efficient public sector that ensures proper functioning of 
government institutions, and raising the level of political accountability. 
 
But there are still some limitations to governance indicators in this research. First, 
it is difficult to generalize about the statistical impact of political governance 
attributes, in part because the attributes are measured in different ways, in 
different studies. Second, it is subject to measurement error. Singh and Jun (1995) 
indicate their concern about the impact of political stability on FDI, the reason 
being the difficulty to obtain reliable quantitative estimates in the long run. 
Moreover, although many previous studies adopt measures that are closely related 
to the idea of governance infrastructure, there has yet been no systematic attempt 
to directly relate governance infrastructure measures to FDI flows for a wide 
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cross-section of countries. This research is wide open for further research with 
different methodologies and techniques. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
FIXED EFFECTS RESULTS 
 
1. CONTROL OF CORRUPTION 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:05 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 111 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
CORR? -0.140350 0.039575 -3.546421 0.0007 
OPENNESS? 5.74E-12 7.05E-13 8.150447 0.0000 
SEC? 9.57E-06 4.07E-06 2.354832 0.0210 
INFRA? -0.815306 0.055325 -14.73654 0.0000 
CPI? -0.046917 0.003667 -12.79566 0.0000 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.018514 0.004349 4.256946 0.0001 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.935193     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 5.748796 
Adjusted R-squared 0.910890     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 6.767828 
S.E. of regression 2.020286     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 326.5244 
F-statistic 230.8855     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 2.063009 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.716014     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.942542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609519     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.538076 
S.E. of regression 2.210890     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 391.0428 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.459058    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:06 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 111 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EFF? -0.379160 0.039517 -9.594779 0.0000 
OPENNESS? 7.14E-12 7.51E-13 9.506307 0.0000 
INFRA? -0.833374 0.039408 -21.14711 0.0000 
CPI? -0.056447 0.003273 -17.24875 0.0000 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.016870 0.005048 3.342148 0.0013 
SEC? 7.47E-06 3.69E-06 2.023335 0.0464 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.919154     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 5.683277 
Adjusted R-squared 0.888837     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 6.105510 
S.E. of regression 2.035649     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 331.5094 
F-statistic 181.9068     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 2.127959 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.717811     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.942542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.611990     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.538076 
S.E. of regression 2.203882     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 388.5677 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.462990    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. RULE OF LAW 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:06 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 106 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
LAW? -0.419545 0.050680 -8.278264 0.0000 
RETURN? 0.017896 0.024715 0.724082 0.4713 
SEC? 2.76E-06 9.16E-06 0.300709 0.7645 
CPI? -0.033134 0.004496 -7.369749 0.0000 
OPENNESS? 4.79E-12 8.35E-13 5.738777 0.0000 
INFRA? -0.786536 0.074979 -10.49005 0.0000 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.026505 0.004665 5.681477 0.0000 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.941115     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 5.150002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916447     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 6.516288 
S.E. of regression 1.883570     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 262.5399 
F-statistic 197.1140     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 2.084561 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.716223     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.978083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.597343     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.613296 
S.E. of regression 2.292827     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 389.0221 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.451086    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. REGULATORY QUALITY 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:07 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 111 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
REG? 0.686652 0.223781 3.068405 0.0029 
CPI? -0.043274 0.011813 -3.663268 0.0004 
OPENNESS? 7.33E-12 2.27E-12 3.236392 0.0018 
SEC? 1.35E-05 1.34E-05 1.005543 0.3177 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.020607 0.010717 1.922907 0.0581 
INFRA? -1.306065 0.328046 -3.981351 0.0001 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.966928     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 6.780432 
Adjusted R-squared 0.954527     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 9.564441 
S.E. of regression 2.039570     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 332.7878 
F-statistic 467.7984     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 2.100449 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.720413     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.942542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.615568     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.538076 
S.E. of regression 2.193698     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 384.9848 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.446264    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.  POLITICAL STABILITY 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:07 
Sample: 1997 2000 
Included observations: 4 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 84 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
STAB? 0.060903 0.134332 0.453380 0.6521 
SEC? 1.12E-05 3.30E-06 3.383921 0.0014 
INFRA? -0.408424 0.141355 -2.889345 0.0056 
CPI? -0.025286 0.010449 -2.420047 0.0190 
OPENNESS? 1.75E-12 8.18E-13 2.137802 0.0372 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.034182 0.007355 4.647350 0.0000 
GDPPERCAPITA?(-
1) 
0.011712 0.008968 1.306040 0.1972 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 1.000000     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 3.85E+15 
Adjusted R-squared 1.000000     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.77E+16 
S.E. of regression 3.082484     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 503.5906 
F-statistic 2.07E+33     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 0.523116 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.597912     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.864504 
Adjusted R-squared 0.370316     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 2.507000 
S.E. of regression 1.989371     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 209.7527 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.504504    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6. VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDIX? 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 03/25/04   Time: 17:07 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 111 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VOICE? 0.471045 0.060550 7.779443 0.0000 
OPENNESS? 5.89E-12 7.21E-13 8.167079 0.0000 
SEC? 9.20E-06 4.25E-06 2.165442 0.0333 
INFRA? -0.717243 0.047418 -15.12606 0.0000 
CPI? -0.038611 0.003805 -10.14875 0.0000 
GDPPERCAPITA? 0.017300 0.003139 5.511753 0.0000 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.958623     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 6.349513 
Adjusted R-squared 0.943106     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 8.351361 
S.E. of regression 1.991999     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 317.4449 
F-statistic 370.6863     Durbin-
Watson stat 
 2.032494 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.716951     Mean 
dependent 
var 
 1.942542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.610808     S.D. 
dependent 
var 
 3.538076 
S.E. of regression 2.207237     Sum 
squared 
resid 
 389.7516 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.446990    
 
 
 
 
 
